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"Our decisions in this troubling area draw lines that often must
seem arbitrary."1

Former Supreme Court Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., characterizing the
Court's parochial school aid cases.
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
part that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion." 2 Perhaps no other constitutional provision has engendered as much confusion and controversy as the establishment
clause.' Despite an abundance of commentary on the subject,4 and
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1. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. This language is commonly referred to as the establishment clause.
3. Supreme Court Justice Byron H. White has observed that "Establishment
Clause cases are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and we are divided among ourselves,
perhaps reflecting the different views on this subject of the people of this country." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). Additionally, former Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. has stated that establish-

over seventy Supreme Court decisions in the past fifty years, 5 the
Court has failed to articulate a satisfactory analysis to apply to establishment clause issues.
One of the most difficult and controversial of all establishment
clause questions concerns governmental efforts to assist children attending parochial schools.' For example, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, struggling with Supreme Court precedent, recently held
that a public school teacher may constitutionally provide secular instruction to religious school students in mobile classrooms parked adjacent to religious school buildings.7 However, the Supreme Court
has held it unconstitutional for public school teachers to provide the
same education to religious school students inside religious school
buildings.8 Moreover, although a state may lend secular, state-ap-

proved textbooks to children attending religious schools,9 it may not
lend the same students maps, erasers, charts or any other kind of
educational materials, even if those materials are used only for secular purposes."0 In other words, a school district may lend a geography book containing a map of the United States to religious school
students but may not lend the map itself.11
These kinds of arbitrary distinctions prompted one eminent
scholar to conclude that the parochial school aid cases decided by
the Supreme Court amount to a "hodge-podge" of decisions derived
from "Alice's Adventures in Wonderland."' 2 This Article explains
ment clause cases have "presented some of the most perplexing questions to come before
the Supreme Court." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 760 (1973).
4. See infra notes 12 and 18.
5. Note, A Conservative Struggles with Lemon: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's
Dissent in Allegheny, 26 TuLSA L.J. 107, 107 (1990).
6. See McKeever, Forbidden Fruit, Governmental Aid to Non-Public Education
and the Primary Effect Test Under the Establishment Clause, 34 VILL. L. REv. 1079,
1079 (1989).
7. Pulido v. Cavazos, 934 F.2d 912, 921 (8th Cir. 1990).
8. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985); Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985). See infra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
9. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 236-37; Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362 (1975);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-48 (1968).
10. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 248-51. See also Marshall, "We Know it When We See
it" The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495 (1986).
11. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
12. Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1,
10 (1984). Other commentators have reached similar conclusions about the Court's establishment clause cases in general. See, e.g., Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in
Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 114 (1986) (the Court's establishment clause cases have been inconsistent and indeterminate); Note, Rebuilding the
Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretationof the Establishment Clause,
81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1473 (1981) (the Supreme Court's establishment clause cases
are characterized by "contradictory assertions, confusing signals, and unsupportable theses"); See generally Hurt, The Use of Endorsement in Establishment Clause Analysis The Key to a New Consensus, 8 Miss. REV. 1, 2 n.8 (citing various commentators who
have criticized the Court's establishment clause cases).
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how the Supreme Court has reached the point where it is drawing
such arbitrary lines and suggests a new analysis which would not

only lead to more consistent results in parochial school aid cases, but
would also safeguard the important interests that the establishment

clause should protect."3
Part I of this Article provides a detailed analysis of the Supreme
Court's parochial school aid decisions and divides the Court's jurisprudence into three general time periods.' 4 In the first period, from

1971-1977, the Supreme Court invalidated virtually every new governmental effort to assist elementary and secondary parochial
schools.' 5 During the second period, from 1977-1985, the Court appeared to change direction and approved many forms of aid to these
schools.' 6 However, in 1985, the beginning of the third period, the
Court decided two cases which limited the type of assistance that
could be provided to religious schools. In doing so, the Court created
much uncertainty as to how the Court would decide such cases in
the future.
The summary contained in Part I demonstrates that much of the
confusion and inconsistency in the Court's decisions can be traced to
the Court's adoption in Lemon v. Kurtzman 8 of the three part test
to evaluate governmental efforts to assist parochial schools.' 9 Part II
13. Although there has been an abundance of commentary on the subject of the
establishment clause, see, e.g., infra note 18, a recent decision by a United States Court
of Appeals presented new and difficult issues pertaining to governmental programs providing support to children attending parochial schools. See Pulido v. Cavazos, 934 F.2d
912 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Barnes v. Cavazos, No. 90-5470, appealfiled, (6th Cir.
March 29, 1990). One important issue presented by both of these cases is whether it is
constitutional for publicly funded teachers to provide secular instruction to children attending religious schools in mobile classrooms parked adjacent to or on private school
property. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has held that it
is unconstitutional for publicly funded teachers to provide such instruction in the buildings of the private schools. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School District of the
City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985). See also infra notes 95-112 and
accompanying text. After these decisions, school districts across the country began providing publicly funded instruction to children attending religious schools in mobile classrooms outside the school buildings; a practice that generated the lawsuits in Pulido and
Barnes. The strong likelihood that the Court will eventually address the constitutionality
of the mobile classroom programs warrants consideration of the proposals set forth in this
Article.
14. See infra notes 25-112 and accompanying text. For the purposes of this Article, the term "parochial school," refers to elementary and secondary religious schools,
not religiously affiliated colleges and universities. See infra note 37.
15. See infra notes 25-59 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 60-94 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
18. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
19. The Lemon Court held that for a statute to be valid under the establishment

of this Article summarizes Justice O'Connor's proposed alternative
to the Lemon test, the "endorsement test," which she has articulated
in non-parochial school aid establishment clause cases. ° Part III
suggests that the underlying principles of the endorsement analysis,
that the core concern of the establishment clause is religious liberty,
and that religious liberty is infringed when the government links political standing to religious belief, are superior to the principles underlying the Lemon test.2 1 Part III also argues that religious liberty,
not endorsement, needs to be the benchmark of establishment clause
analysis.2 2 Part IV expands on that principle, and Part V applies
23
that analysis to governmental efforts to assist parochial schools.
The conclusion reached by this application is that religiously neutral
parochial school aid programs do not infringe religious liberty and
therefore do not violate the establishment clause.2 4
clause, it must: 1) have a secular legislative purpose, 2) its primary effect must not be to
hinder or advance religion, and 3) the statute must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13. See also infra notes 25-36 and accompanying
text. The Lemon test has been criticized by individual members of the Court. See, e.g.,
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[tlhe three-part
[Lemon] test has simply not provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment
Clause cases."); and Wolman, 433 U.S. at 265 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that the Lemon test be abolished and that a "no aid" test be
established). The Lemon test has also been criticized by numerous commentators. See,
e.g., Evans, Beyond Neutralism: A Suggested Historically Justifiable Approach to Establishment Clause Analysis, 64 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 41 (1989); Paulsen, Religion,
Equality, and the Constitution:An Equal ProtectionApproach to Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311 (1986); Choper, The Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PIn. L. REv. 673 (1980). See also
Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should it be Retained, Reformulated or Rejected?, 4 NOTRE
DAME J. L., ETHics & PuB. POL'Y 513, 543 (1990) ("[i]t is hard to think of contemporary legal doctrine that is as besieged from all quarters as is the Lemon test"). Nevertheless, the Court has continued to apply the Lemon test, albeit in a slightly altered form, in
recent establishment clause cases. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Edwards
v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481 (1986). See Lively, The Establishment Clause: Lost Soul of the First
Amendment, 50 OHIo ST. LJ. 681, 689 (1989) (despite the "patent inadequacies" of the
Lemon test, the Court has "rarely" deviated from it). At least one commentator has
recently suggested that the Court should continue to apply the Lemon test. Esbeck, supra
note 18, at 548.
20. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For a discussion of these
cases and Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis, see infra notes 113-36 and accompanying text. Justice O'Connor did not expressly apply an endorsement analysis to the two
parochial school aid cases that have come before the Court during her tenure on the
Court. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 421-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Grand Rapids, 473
U.S. at 398-400 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see Witters, 474 U.S. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (applying endorsement analysis to a
challenge to state program assisting student attending a religious college).
21. See infra notes 137-83 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 185-236 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 186-236 and accompanying text.

ParochialSchool Aid

[VOL 28: 263, 1991]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

I.

CONFUSION AND INCONSISTENCY-THE SUPREME COURT'S
PAROCHIAL SCHOOL AID DECISIONS

A.

The First Period: 1971-1977

The landmark of parochial school aid case is Lemon v. Kurtzman,25 decided by the Supreme Court in 1971.26 The Lemon Court
examined the constitutionality of a Rhode Island statute that supple-

mented the salaries of parochial school teachers who taught secular
subjects. In addition, the Lemon Court also examined the constitutionality of a similar Pennsylvania statute which reimbursed private
schools for some of the costs (such as teachers' salaries, textbooks
and other instructional materials) of providing secular instruction.
The Lemon Court held that for a statute to be valid under the establishment clause, it must:
1) have a secular legislative purpose;
2) Its primary effect must neither hinder nor advance religion; and
3) The statute must not foster excessive government entanglement with
religion.28

In applying the three part test to the facts of Lemon, the Court
first found that both the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island programs
had a secular legislative purpose-improving the quality of secular

education in the state. 29 However, the Court did not apply the pri25. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
26. Prior to Lemon, the Court had decided only two parochial school aid cases on
establishment clause grounds. In Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), decided 24
years before Lemon, the Court upheld a state law authorizing reimbursement to parents
of children attending religious schools of the cost of transporting their children to school
on the grounds that the statute was designed to promote safe transportation of children,
not to assist religion. Id. at 18. And, in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968),
the Court approved a state law authorizing the lending of textbooks to children attending
private schools because the books were secular in nature and were loaned directly to the
students not to the schools. Id. Although the Lemon Court relied on Everson and Allen
in fashioning its now famous three part test, the Court reached a different result in
Lemon and, for the first time, invalidated a state's efforts to assist parochial schools.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 611-13. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
27. 403 U.S. at 607-10.
28. Id. at 612-13. TheCourt cited Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), see supra note 26,
to support the first two prongs of the test. The Court cited Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664 (1970), to support the third prong of the test. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. In
Walz, the Court upheld state tax exemptions for real property used for religious worship
by religious organizations. Walz, 397 U.S. at 680.
29. 403 U.S. at 613 ("the statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended
to enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools. . . .There is no reason to
believe the legislatures meant anything else"). The secular purpose prong of the Lemon
test will not be discussed again in Section II of this Article because the Supreme Court
has never invalidated an educational assistance program on the grounds that its purpose
was religious. See Hurt, supra note 12, at 5 n.30 ("no program involving state aid to

mary effect requirement of its test to the facts of Lemon. Instead,
the Court based its holding on the failure of both programs to meet
the third prong of the test because they fostered excessive government entanglement with religion. 30
The Court stated that the proverbial "wall" separating church and
state is not actually a "wall," but just a "blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier."' 31 The Court held that the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania programs unlawfully crossed this "barrier. ' 32 The primary
reason cited by the Court for this conclusion was that, although both
statutes prohibited reimbursement for religious classes, a prerequisite under the establishment clause, parochial school teachers would
nonetheless have difficulty keeping religious influences out of their
secular courses because those teachers taught in the pervasively sectarian atmosphere of the private schools. 33 Although the Court conceded that the record was devoid of any evidence that such religious
influence had actually taken place, the Court held that the monitoring of those classes by public officials to insure the absence of religious influence resulted in excessive entanglement between church
and state. Accordingly, the Court invalidated both programs under
the third prong of the Lemon test. 34
In dissent, Justice White argued that the reasoning of Lemon created an "insoluble paradox. '3 5 He noted that the Court held that
states could not finance secular instruction in parochial schools if
there was a possibility that religious influence would pervade that
instruction, but if the state adopted procedures to insure that there
was no such religious influence, those procedures would foster impermissible excessive entanglement with religion. 36 The Lemon majority
was perhaps aware of this weakness in its reasoning as it conceded
that it could "only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation of this

church related schools has been found constitutionally infirm for want of a valid secular
purpose"). For a discussion of why the inquiry into legislative purpose should be abandoned altogether, see infra notes 145 and 196.
30. Id. at 613-14.
31. Id. at 614-25.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 617-19.
34. Id. at 618-20. The Court also found that the programs caused excessive entanglement for two other reasons. First, it held that the auditing procedures in the Rhode
Island program were "fraught with the sort of entanglement that the Constitution forbids" because the public school officials had to "examine the [private] school's records in
order to determine how much of the total expenditures [were] attributable to secular
education and how much to religious activity." Id. at 620. Second, the Court held that
the programs would lead to "political divisiveness" because voters in the states would be
divided on whether to support these kinds of programs. Id. at 622-24. See infra notes 120
and 195, for a further discussion of the "political divisiveness" analysis.
35. 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
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37
extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law."

In the wake of Lemon, states began to draft statutes to provide
assistance to parochial schools that did not contain procedures to in-

sure that the programs were entirely secular so that the programs
would not run afoul of the excessive entanglement prong of the

Lemon test. For instance, in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,38 the Court examined a New York stat-

ute providing various types of assistance to parochial schools. The
statute authorized direct grants to private schools for maintenance
and repair of buildings to protect the safety of the children attending
those schools, 39 and it provided partial tuition reimbursements and
tax credits to parents of children attending private schools. 40 The
Court held that all of these programs unlawfully advanced religion
under the second prong of the Lemon test because there were no
procedures in place to insure that the monies provided to the schools
41

and to the parents would not be used for religious purposes. Of
course, had there been such procedures, they would probably have
run afoul of the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test.42

37. 403 U.S. at 612. On the same day as Lemon, the Court decided Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), in which the Court approved federal monetary aid to
colleges and universities, including religious institutions, for construction of academic facilities. The Court approved this aid, with the exception of that part of the statute which
stated that the law's prohibition on the use of facilities for religious purpose would expire
after twenty years, on the grounds that the maturity of college students and the lack of
religious permeation in the schools posed little risk that the aid would advance religion or
foster excessive entanglement between church and state. Id. at 685-87. See also Hurt,
supra note 12, at 14. Subsequent to Tilton, the Court consistently applied a more deferential standard to governmental programs assisting colleges and universities than to programs assisting elementary and secondary schools. See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Public
Works, 425 U.S. 736 (1976) (approving grants to private colleges, some of which were
religiously affiliated); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (approving issuance of a
revenue bond for a Baptist college).
38. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
39. Id. at 763-64. A similar safety rationale was used by the Court to uphold the
bus transportation program in Everson, 330 U.S. at 1. See supra note 26.
40. 413 U.S. at 764-69.
41. Id. at 794.
42. See Hurt, supra note 12, at 14 n.103. On the same day as Nyquist, the Court
decided Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973), in which the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania tuition reimbursement program for parents of private school children that the
Court found constitutionally indistinguishable from the New York programs struck down
in Nyquist. 413 U.S. at 828. Also in 1973, the Court decided Levitt v. Comm. for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973), in which the Court examined a New
York statute which reimbursed private schools for the costs of complying with state mandated testing requirements. Most of these costs were associated with preparing and grading state required examinations which had to be secular. Id. at 474- 78. Nevertheless, the
Court held that the statute was unconstitutional under the primary effect prong of the
Lemon test because there was no monitoring procedure in place to make sure that the

By the end of 1973, the Court had invalidated salary supplements
for private school teachers,4 3 tax benefits and tuition reimbursements
for parents of children attending religious schools,44 of payments to
private schools for the repair of buildings,45 and the expense of complying with state testing requirements. 46 Although the Court was
hostile to governmental efforts to assist parochial schools, the results
reached by the Court from its application of the Lemon test were
arguably consistent. This consistency ended in 1975, however, when
the Supreme Court issued its decision in Meek v. Pittenger.47
In Meek, the Court examined a Pennsylvania statute that loaned,
not only secular textbooks to private school children as had been approved in Board of Education v. Allen,48 but also instructional
equipment and materials such as film projectors, maps, globes and
laboratory equipment. 49 The statute also authorized the state to provide secular "auxiliary services" to children in private schools on the
premises of the private schools."' These auxiliary services included
guidance counseling, remedial instruction, and speech and hearing
services. 5x .
The Court began by noting that the textbook portion of the statute
was indistinguishable from the textbook program upheld in Board of
Education v. Allen, and therefore was constitutional.52 However, the
Court went on to hold that the loan of secular educational equipment
and materials other than textbooks violated the primary effect prong
of the Lemon test. The Court held that such aid, although
earmarked for non-religious purposes, advanced the religious mission
of the schools because the religious mission and the secular educational mission could not be separated in elementary and secondary
parochial schools.53 The Court distinguished the loan of equipment
and materials from the loan of textbooks upheld in Board of Education v. Allen on the grounds that the equipment and materials were
loaned directly to the private schools, whereas the books were loaned
to the students.54
tests were actually secular. Id. at 479-82.
43. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
45. Id.
46. See supra note 42.

47. 421 U.S. 350 (1975).
48. See supra note 26.

49. 421 U.S. at 355.
50. Id. at 351-55.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 359-62.
53. Id. at 365-66.
54. Id. at 362-63 (stating that "[a]lthough textbooks are lent only to students, [the
statute at issue] authorizes the loan of instructional material and equipment directly to
qualifying" private schools).

270
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In dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted that, in Allen, the textbooks
were stored at the private schools and used by the students in a manner indistinguishable from the equipment and materials at issue in
Meek. 55 He argued that there was no real distinction between the
lending of educational materials to the schools and the lending of
such materials to the students and therefore, the majority's reasoning was faulty."8
The Meek Court also invalidated that portion of the statute authorizing "auxiliary services" in the private schools. 57 The 58Court
held that these services, like the salary supplements in Lemon, violated the third prong of the Lemon test because the monitoring necessary to insure that the teachers providing the auxiliary services did
not teach religion would foster excessive entanglement between
church and state.59
The Meek decision evidenced the Court's reluctance to approve
most forms of assistance to parochial schools as well as the difficulty
the Court was having applying the Lemon test. These problems intensified during the 1977-1985 period even though the Court began
to be more lenient towards state programs designed to assist children
attending parochial schools.
B. The Second Period: 1977-1985
0 the Court examined an Ohio statute that:
In Wolman v. Walter,6
pupils textbooks, instructional materials and
school
1) loaned private
equipment; 2) authorized the state to provide standardized testing
and diagnostic services for students attending private schools; 3) authorized therapeutic and remedial services for these students off the
premises of the private schools; and 4) provided funds for field trip
transportation.61 The Court once again affirmed the lending of textbooks relying on Allen and Meek, and specifically rejected the plaintiffs' request that the Court overrule those decisions.6 2
55. Id. at 390-91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 391 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 367-73.
58. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
59. 421 U.S. at 369-70. The Court did not question the good faith of the public
school personnel providing the services, but held that the "prophylactic contacts required
to ensure that teachers play a strictly nonideological role . . . necessarily give rise to a
constitutionally intolerable degree of entanglement between church and state." Id. at
369-70 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619).

60. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
61. Id. at 233.
62. Id. at 236-38.

The Court also approved the providing of state testing and scoring
services for children attending private schools. The Court upheld this
aid saying that, because the state prepared and graded the tests,
there was no danger of any religious content in the tests. 3 The
Court distinguished Levitt v. Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty, 4 on the grounds that in Levitt, unlike Wolman,
the public school authorities had no control over the tests and therefore could not insure that they were completely secular.65
The Wolman Court also approved the use of public school personnel to provide diagnostic testing to private school children in private
school buildings. The Court held that, unlike teaching and counseling, diagnostic testing does not involve the transmission of substantive views. Accordingly, there was no danger of a religious message
being conveyed by the public school employee. 0 The Court also held
that providing secular services such as therapeutic and remedial services to private school children in neutral locations off the premises
of the private schools did not advance religion or foster excessive
entanglement because the services were provided outside
the perva67
sively sectarian atmosphere of the private schools.
The Wolman Court then turned to the lending of equipment and
materials.68 Ohio attempted to distinguish the equipment and materials program invalidated in Meek on the grounds that the statute in
Meek loaned the equipment and materials directly to the schools,
whereas the Ohio program loaned the equipment and materials directly to the students or parents.69 The Wolman Court rejected this
distinction stating that, prior to Meek, Ohio loaned the materials directly to the schools and the use of those materials did not change
after the statute was amended.7 0 Therefore, as it did in Meek, the
Court invalidated the lending of equipment and materials on the
grounds that such aid had the primary effect of advancing religion
under the second prong of the Lemon test. 1
63. Id. at 240.
64. See 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (supra note 42).
65. 433 U.S. at 240.
66. Id. at 241-43 (stating that "[t]he nature of the relationship between the diagnostician and the pupil does not provide the same opportunity for the transmission of
sectarian views as attends the relationship between teacher and student or that between
counselor and student").
67. Id. at 244-48.
68. The equipment and materials included such items as record players, maps,
globes, and science kits. Id. at 249.
69. Id. at 250. ("Appellees seek to avoid Meek by emphasizing that it involved a
program of direct loans to nonpublic schools. In contrast, the material and equipment at
issue under the Ohio statute are loaned to the pupil or his parent."). Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 251 n.18. The Court recognized, however, that this decision was inconsistent with its holding that textbooks could be loaned and stated that there was "tension
between this result and the holding in [Allen]." Id. Instead of trying to reconcile this
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Finally, the Wolman Court invalidated the public funding of field
trips for private school students under both the second and third
prongs of the Lemon test. 2 The Court held that field trips had an
educational component that the bus transportation program upheld
in Everson v. Board of Education did not, 73 and therefore, the funding of the field trips had the primary effect of unlawfully advancing

religion. 74 The Court also noted that the private school teacher made
the field trip a valuable experience. Therefore, the state's monitoring

of that teacher to insure that no religious message was communicated would foster excessive entanglement between church and

state. 5
In his concurring opinion in Wolman, Justice Powell stated that
"[o]ur decisions in this troubling area draw lines that often must
seem arbitrary.

'7'

To illustrate Justice Powell's point, the Wolman

Court held that textbooks could be lent to private school children but
not maps or charts. 7 Furthermore, the Court held that providing

equipment and materials to children attending religious schools constituted an unlawful subsidy to those schools,7 8 but providing remedial classroom instruction to private school children did not have the
same effect provided the instruction took place off the school
grounds.79 The Court drew this distinction even though providing
classroom instruction subsidized the private schools to an equal or
greater extent than the loaning of maps and globes.

Wolman was significant because it demonstrated that the Court
would continue to apply the Lemon test to parochial school aid cases

even if the application of that test led to inconsistent results. The
Wolman decision also demonstrated that the Court was becoming

somewhat less hostile to governmental efforts to assist parochial
tension, the Court simply noted that it would only follow Allen as a matter of stare
decisis and that it was not going to extend that decision to cover any other types of aid.
Id at 252 n.18.
72. 433 U.S. at 252-54.
73. See supra note 26.
74. 433 U.S. at 254 (stating that "[tihe field trips are an integral part of the educational experience, and where the teacher works within and for a sectarian institution,
an unacceptable risk of fostering of religion is an inevitable byproduct.").
75. Id.
76. Id. at 262 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also infra
note 1. One commentator has labeled this comment "a masterpiece of understatement."
See Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses,Liberal Neutrality, and
the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151, 158 n.40 (1986).
77. Id. at 249.
78. Id. at 250-51.
79. Id. at 244-48.

schools because it marked the first time since Lemon that the Court
approved aid, other than textbooks, to such schools. Although the
Court would continue to apply Lemon, its application of that test
was about to change dramatically.
In the early 1980s, the Supreme Court decided two significant parochial school aid cases. In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Regan,80 the Court examined a New York statute
that provided direct cash reimbursements to private schools for compliance with state testing requirements where the tests were prepared
by the state but administered and graded by the private schools.81
New York enacted this statute after the Supreme Court had invalidated its previous testing reimbursement statute because that statute
did not limit reimbursement to state prepared exams.8 2 Justice
White, writing for the Court, applied the Lemon test and upheld
these direct cash grants. He stated that Wolman v. Walter8 3 was
controlling because, if the state could administer and grade state
prepared exams for private school students, 4 then the state could
reimburse the private schools for performing the identical tasks.8 5
The decision in Regan is significant because it marked the only time
that the Supreme Court has approved direct cash educational subsidies to parochial schools.
Justice Stevens dissented in Regan and noted that the private
schools had an obligation under state law to administer the tests that
were at issue. Accordingly, by reimbursing the private schools for
the cost of those tests, the state was providing an unconstitutional
subsidy to those schools.86 He characterized the Court's previous parochial school aid decisions as "a long line of cases making largely
ad hoc decisions about what payments may or may not be constitutionally made to nonpublic schools."8a7 He concluded that trying to
patch together the "blurred, indistinct and variable barrier" of separation between church and state described in Lemon was a hopeless
task and that the Court should instead simply invalidate all governmental aid to parochial schools. 88
Three years after Regan, and twelve years after Lemon, the Su80. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
81. Id. at 651-52.
82. Id at 648-52. See also supra note 42.
83. 433 U.S. at 229 (1977). See also supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
85. 444 U.S. at 657 ("As in Wolman v. Walter,. . . the nonpublic school does not
control the content of the test or its result; and here, as in Wolman, this factor serves to
prevent the use of the test as a part of religious teaching . . . thus avoiding the kind of
direct aid forbidden by the Court's prior cases"). Id. at 656 (quoting Wolman, 433 U.S.
at 240).
86. Id. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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preme Court decided a case which, contrary to Justice Stevens'
hopes, upheld another form of aid to parochial school students. In
Mueller v. Allen,8 9 the Court upheld a Minnesota statute which provided an income tax deduction for tuition and other educational expenses for parents of students who attended religious schools. The
Court held that the statute did not unlawfully advance religion because it provided benefits directly to the parents rather than the

schools, and because the deductions were theoretically available to
parents of children attending both religious and non-religious

schools, although most of the benefits went to parents of children in

private religious schools. 90 The Court distinguished Committee for

Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyguist,91 where the
Court had invalidated similar tax benefits to parents of children attending private schools, on the grounds that the statute in Nyguist
applied exclusively to parents of private school children, whereas the
statute in Mueller, at least on its face, applied to parents of both
public and private school children.92
The highly questionable lesson of Mueller was that states wanting
to assist parochial schools should draft statutes that facially benefit-

ted all schools, even if in practice the program mostly assisted religious schools. Moreover, the Court's reliance in Mueller on the facial neutrality of the statute to answer the question whether the
primary effect of the statute advanced religion was questionable at

best. 3

89. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
90. Id. at 398-99. See also infra note 92.
91. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
92. 463 U.S. at 398. The Court in Mueller also drew a distinction between the
"tax credit" plan in Nyquist and a genuine "tax deduction." 463 U.S. at 396-97 n.6.
This distinction, however, is not persuasive because the statutes in both Mueller and
Nyquist had "largely equivalent effects" on "religious exercise-the matter really at issue." See Paulsen, supra note 18, at 357.
Moreover, as the dissent in Mueller pointed out, most of the benefits provided by the
statute went to parents of children attending private schools because parents of children
attending public schools generally did not pay tuition or have other educational expenses.
Id. at 405 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In 1978-79, for example, only 79 out of 815,000
students who attended public schools were eligible for the tuition deduction whereas over
90,000 private school students qualified for the deduction, 95% of whom attended religious schools. Id. The majority in Mueller stated, however, that it was not going to examine the year-to-year impact of the statute because "such an approach would scarcely
provide the certainty that this field stands in need of, nor can we perceive principled
standards by which such statistical evidence might be evaluated." Id. at 401.
93. See Note, FaciallyNeutral Tax Deductionsfor EducationalExpenses and the
Establishment Clause, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 297, 315 (1984) ("[tlhe majority's
refusal to look beyond the facial neutrality of the statute is the most questionable aspect
of the Mueller decision").

After Mueller and Reagan, it appeared that the Court had
changed direction and would be far more tolerant of governmental
aid to parochial schools. 94 However, two years after Mueller, the
Court decided two cases which demonstrated that the Court had
changed direction once again.
C. The Third Period: 1985-The Present
On July 1, 1985, the Supreme Court decided its two most recent
cases involving governmental efforts to assist the education of children attending parochial schools. In School District of the City of
Grand Rapids v. Ball,9" the Court invalidated two state programs
conducted in rented private school classrooms, one taught by public
school teachers during the regular school day, and one taught after
regular school hours by private school teachers.96 Although both programs were limited to secular courses that were "supplemental" to
the curriculum already offered by the private schools, 97 there was no
monitoring of the programs to guard against the teaching of religion
during the secular classes. 98
The Court invalidated both programs under the second prong of
the Lemon test. 99 The Court set forth three reasons why the programs unlawfully advanced religion. First, although the Court did
not dispute the good faith of the teachers, the Court stated, as it had
in the past,100 that even the best intentioned teachers may become
inadvertently involved in inculcating religious beliefs when they
teach in the pervasively sectarian atmosphere of the parochial
schools. 10 1 Second, the Court stated that the programs provided a
symbolic benefit to religion by linking government and religion in the
eyes of impressionable students and the public. 1 02 Third, the Court
said that the programs advanced religion because, by subsidizing the
secular education of the private schools, the Court was also subsi94. See Note, supra note 93, at 300 ("[t]he Mueller decision marks a significant
shift in constitutional doctrine regarding aid to parochial schools and the establishment
clause").
95. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
96. Id. at 376-77.
97. Id. at 375-76, 396.
98. Id. at 387.
99. Id. at 397-98. The Court stated that, because the programs violated the primary effect prong of the Lemon test, it "need not determine whether aspects of the challenged programs impermissibly entangle the government in religious matters, in violation
of the third prong of the Lemon test." Id. at 397 n.14.
100. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618-19.
101. 473 U.S. at 387 (stating that "[t]he danger arises 'not because the public
employee is likely [to] deliberately subvert his task to the service of religion, but rather
because the pressures of the environment might alter his behavior from its normal
course.' "). Id. (quoting Wolman, 433 U.S. at 247).
102. 473 U.S. at 389-92. This was the first time the Court employed this symbolic
union analysis in a parochial school aid case. See Marshall, supra note 10, at 520.
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dizing the religious mission of the schools because those missions

could not be separated.10 3
On the same day that Grand Rapids was decided, the Court examined, in Aguilar v. Felton,10 4 a federal program similar to the
state programs invalidated in GrandRapids.10 5 This federal program
also authorized public school teachers to provide secular education to

children attending religious schools in the classrooms of the religious

schools. 10 6 However, unlike the programs in Grand Rapids, the fed-

eral program in Felton had a monitoring system in place to prevent

the teachers from providing a religious message during the secular
instruction. 10 7 Nevertheless, the Court held that it was unconstitutional for public school employees to teach in the classrooms of the
private schools because the monitoring of those teachers resulted in
excessive entanglement between church and state. 0
The Court's decisions in Grand Rapids and Felton bring into
sharp focus the analytical problems with the Lemon test and the
"Catch-22" of the excessive entanglement and primary effect portions of the test. 09 The state programs in GrandRapids were invalidated because there was no monitoring system in place to insure that
103. Id. at 392-97. Justice O'Connor concurred in part in Grand Rapids, joining
that part of the decision invalidating the state program that paid private school teachers
to instruct children attending that school after regular school hours. Id. at 399-400
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She stated that "[w]hen fulltime parochial school teachers receive public funds to teach secular courses to their parochial school students under parochial school supervision, . . . the program has the perceived and actual effect of advancing the religious aims of the church-related schools.").
Id. For a further discussion of Justice O'Connor's views, see infra notes 113-36 and accompanying text.
104. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
105. Id. at 409 (stating that "[t]he New York programs challenged in this case
are very similar to the programs we examined in Ball").
106. Id. at 404-07.
107. Id. at 406-07.
108. The Court stated that "the pervasive monitoring by public authorities in the
sectarian schools infringes precisely those Establishment Clause values at the root of the
prohibition of excessive entanglement. . . . [T]he religious school, which has as a primary purpose the advancement and preservation of a particular religion must endure the
ongoing presence of state personnel whose primary purpose is to monitor teachers and
students in an attempt to guard against the infiltration of religious thought." Id. at 413.
The Court also held that the "administrative cooperation" required to maintain the educational program fostered excessive entanglement because it resulted in "frequent contacts" between the private and public school teachers. Id.
Ironically, former Chief Justice Burger, who had written the majority opinion in
Lemon, and was the author of the three part test, dissented bitterly in Felton, saying that
the decision "border[ed] on paranoia," and had no support in "logic, experience, or history." Id. at 419 and 420.
109. See 473 U.S. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

the teachers did not inculcate religious values, whereas the federal
program in Felton was invalidated because this type of monitoring
system was created to guard against the transmission of such values.110 In addition, both programs were held unconstitutional even
though the records in the cases did not exhibit a single instance of
unlawful religious indoctrination in the private schools."' 1 The "insoluble paradox" created by the Lemon test, 11 2 was never more apparent than after Grand Rapids and Felton. The next section of this
Article summarizes Justice O'Connor's alternative to this "insoluble
paradox," the endorsement test.
II. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S ENDORSEMENT ANALYSIS As AN

To THE LEMON TEST
Justice O'Connor first articulated her endorsement analysis in
Lynch v. Donnelly,113 where the Court upheld a publicly funded nativity scene that was part of a Christmas display in a park owned by
a private corporation. 1 4 Applying the Lemon test, the Court found
that the nativity scene was a "passive symbol","15 the purpose of
which was to celebrate the holiday season, not to celebrate Christianity. Therefore, the funding of the scene did not violate the establishment clause. 1 '
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment but wrote separately
to "suggest a clarification of our establishment clause doctrine."' 1 7
She suggested that the establishment clause "prohibits government
from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community." 1 8 Justice O'Connor
stated that government can "run afoul" of that prohibition by either
excessive entanglement with religious institutions or by endorsing or
1
disapproving religion. 19
Justice O'Connor applied her endorsement analysis to the nativity
ALTERNATIVE

110. See Comment, Grand Rapids School District v. Ball and Aguilar v. Felton:
Confusion in Applying Lemon v. Kurtzman's Effects and Entanglement Tests, 50 ALB.
L. Rav. 811, 825 (1986).
111. See 473 U.S. at 388-89; 473 U.S. at 424 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also
Paulsen, supra note 18, at 360-61.
112. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
113. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
114. Id.at 671.
115. Id.at 686.
116. Id. at 685-87.
117. Id.at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 687-88 (government entanglement with religious institutions "may interfere with the independence of the institutions," or "give the institutions access to government or governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents of the religion," and
endorsement "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community.").
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scene by first agreeing with the district court that there was no excessive institutional entanglement present in the case. 20 She then
stated that "[t]he central issue in this case is whether Pawtucket has

endorsed Christianity by its display of the [nativity scene]. ' ' 121 To

answer this question, she reformulated the first two prongs of the
Lemon task to ask whether the government's "actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion," and whether the effect of the governmental practice, regardless1' 22of its purpose, "conveys a message of
endorsement or disapproval.'
Justice O'Connor answered the first question in the negative by
finding, as did the majority, that the purpose of the nativity scene
was to celebrate a public holiday, not to endorse a religious message. 1' To answer the second question, she compared the nativity
scene to the printing of "In God We Trust" on coins and with opening sessions of the Court with "God save the United States and this
honorable court," and stated that the nativity scene had more historical than religious significance and was understood more as a celebration of a public holiday than religious beliefs. 24 Accordingly,
Justice O'Connor believed that the nativity scene did not endorse or
disapprove
of religion and therefore did not violate the establishment
25
clause.
Justice O'Connor refined her endorsement analysis in Wallace v.
Jaffree,126 where the Court invalidated an Alabama statute authorizing a moment of silence in the public schools on the grounds that the
statute lacked a secular legislative purpose under the first prong of
the Lemon test. 127 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
stated that the Alabama statute violated the establishment clause
because both the intent and the effect of the statute was to endorse
religious prayer in the public schools.' 28 However, she also concluded
that other moment of silence statutes could pass constitutional mus120. Id. at 689. Justice O'Connor also stated that the "political divisiveness" doctrine should not be an independent consideration under the establishment clause. See
also supra note 34 and infra note 195.
121. Id. at 690.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 691.
124. Id. at 692-93.
125. Id. at 694.
126. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
127. Id. at 56 ("the enactment of [the statute] was not motivated by any secular
purpose-indeed, the statute had no secular purpose") (emphasis in original).
128. Id. at 77-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted that the
State of Alabama had conceded in the district court that the purpose of the statute was
to "make prayer part of daily classroom activity." Id. at 77-78.

ter if their intent was to encourage a129moment of reflection of any
kind, not necessarily religious prayer.
In Jaffree, Justice O'Connor also expanded on how she would apply her endorsement analysis. She stated that the review of legislative intent under the first prong of the test should be deferential and
limited. 130 She stated that under the second prong of the test, the
"relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the
text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would
perceive it as a state endorsement" of religion.1 31 She summarized
her endorsement test as follows:
The endorsement test does not preclude government from acknowledging

religion or from taking religion in account into making law or policy. It
does preclude government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.

Such an endorsement infringes the religious liberty of the nonadherent, for

'[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of the government is

placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved
religion is plain." 3

After Jaffree, Justice O'Connor continued to advocate her endorsement analysis in establishment clause cases.1 33 Moreover, in
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 34 Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Court, employed Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis to invalidate the City of Pittsburgh's nativity scene display but hold constitutional a menorah placed next to a Christmas tree. 3 ' Justice Blackmun stated that the endorsement test "provides a sound analytical
framework for evaluating governmental use of religious symbols.' 136
However, it is far from clear whether a majority of the Court will
apply Justice O'Connor's endorsement test to establishment clause
cases not involving religious symbols, such as parochial school aid
cases.

129. Id. at 73-74.
130. Id. at 74-75.
131. Id. at 76.
132. Id. at 70, quoting, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
133. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Estate of Thornton
v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
134. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
135. Id. at 3115-16.
136. Id. at 3102. See infra note 182. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's criticism of the endorsement test in his concurring and dissenting opinion in County of
Allegheny.
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III. THE FAILINGS OF THE LEMON AND ENDORSEMENT TESTS
A.

The Core Concern of the Establishment Clause

Whatever the establishment clause means, it cannot mean that a

state can loan a book to a private school student but not a map or
chart,137 or that publicly funded teachers can provide instruction in
mobile classrooms parked six inches away from private school class-

rooms13 8 but not in private school classrooms.1 3 9 Nevertheless, the

application of the Lemon test has led to these results.
Before turning to the specific analytical failings of the Lemon test,
it is essential to identify, in a general way, the core value that the
establishment clause should protect.1 40 There "is near-universal
agreement that the establishment clause.

the protection of religious liberty.

1 41

. .

has as its ultimate goal

Justice O'Connor has stated

that "the Court has been and remains unanimous" that the purpose

of the establishment clause "is to secure religious liberty."

42

The

137. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
138. See Pulido, 934 F.2d at 921.
139. Aguilar, 473 U.S. 402; Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. 373.
140. For a detailed discussion of the appropriate concerns of the establishment
clause, see infra notes 185-236 and accompanying text.
141. Esbeck, supra note 18, at 514.
142. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 67-68 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also County of
Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3136 ("[t]he freedom to worship as one pleases without government interference ... is the great object of both the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses") (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ward, Reconceptualizing Establishment Clause Cases as Free Exercise Class Actions, 98 YALE L.J.
1739, 1744 (1989) ("[t]he historical evidence ... suggests that ... the primary concern of the establishment clause is the protection of religious liberty"); McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 23 (1985) ("[rjeligious liberty-both in
the sense of individual choice in matters of religion and in the sense of autonomous
churches operating without government intrusion-is the appropriate central value for the
regulation of church-state relations."); Choper, supra note 18, at 678 ("the central aim
of the Religion Clauses" is the "protection of religious liberty.").
Although some commentators have reached this conclusion by resorting to the intentions of the founding fathers, (see, e.g., Ward, supra at 1744) I have not relied upon
historical proof as support of my thesis, but rather on the unanimity of opinion on the
subject and an analysis of how the establishment clause can best be interpreted in today's
religiously diverse society. As Professor Lively has correctly pointed out,
[c]onstitutional interests are not well served when principle emerges primarily
from a competition among favorite versions of history. Searches for original
intent run a significant risk of devolving into identification of the most serviceable purpose. Emphasis upon the aims of one framer, or even of the entire assemblage of constitutional architects, also risks investment in a manifestly imperfect body (footnote omitted) and guesswork, while discounting the ability of
subsequent generations to engage in a critical aspect of self-governance. Lively,
supra note 18, at 694.
See also Beschle, supra note 76, at 164 ("the vast changes in society . . . make it un-

problem is not the Court's failure to "agree on the purpose that underlies" the establishment clause but on the Court's inability "to obtain agreement on the standards that govern [its] application. 143

Accordingly, for the purposes of the following discussion, it will be

assumed that the core concern of the establishment clause is the pro44
tection of religious liberty.1
B.

The Weaknesses of the Lemon Test

The main failing of the Lemon test is that it fails to identify how

religious liberty is impacted by its three prongs. It is not self-evident
that a legislative enactment infringes religious liberty simply because

its purpose is religious, 45 its primary effect advances religion, 48 or
because governmental and religious entities entangle themselves to
achieve purely secular goals. 47 The Lemon test obscures what
clear that even if the framers' ends are immutable standards of constitutional interpretation, the framers' preferred means would, today, bring us closer to those ends").
143. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
144. The protection of religious freedom is also the central concern of the free
exercise clause which enjoins Congress from "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion.
U.S. CoNsT. amend I. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (the
"common purpose [of both religion clauses] is to secure religious liberty"); Choper,
supra note 18, at 678 ("the "central aim of the Religion Clauses" is the "protection of
religious liberty"). Although the Supreme Court has generally applied a free exercise
analysis to governmental programs which penalize or prohibit religious beliefs or practices, and not to parochial aid statutes, see infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text,
several commentators have recently suggested that the two clauses should be applied in
the same manner. See Paulsen, supra note 18, at 350-51; Ward, supra note 142, at 173940. The correctness of this proposition, as well as the scope of the free exercise clause, is
beyond the scope of this Article, which is concerned only with whether the government is
prohibited from assisting parochial schools-an issue that the Supreme Court has analyzed exclusively under the establishment clause.
145. In addition to the well documented problems with attempting to ascertain the
subjective motivations that led to the adoption of specific pieces of legislation, see Esbeck, supra note 18, at 516-17, it makes little sense to invalidate a law that when implemented does not infringe religious liberty solely because the intent of the law was religious. See Choper, supra note 18, at 687, and note 195, infra.
146. Justice O'Connor has stated that the "Lemon test is properly interpreted not
to require invalidation of a government practice merely because it in fact causes, even as
a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion . . . .What is crucial is that a
government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J.,concurring). Justice O'Connor is correct that the advancement of religion, in and of itself, does
not amount to a constitutional violation because there are many circumstances where
religion is advanced, such as when churches are provided text-exempt status, but where
there is no harm to religious liberty. Moreover, it is often extremely difficult to determine
whether a statute's primary effect, as opposed to simply its effect, advances religion. As
discussed, infra notes 165-84 and accompanying text, the Court should focus on whether
religious liberty is infringed, not with whether religion is advanced.
147. The mere fact that governmental and religious officials work together to further secular goals does not by itself implicate religious liberty. Although excessive entanglement between religious and governmental officials might, under certain circumstances,
lead to the derogation of religious liberty, the establishment clause violation should be
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should be the essential inquiry of establishment clause analysis; does

the law at issue infringe religious liberty?14 8

The inconsistent results in the area of parochial school aid can be
traced directly to the Court's failure to identify how the programs it
has invalidated infringe religious liberty. For example, in Aguilar v.

Felton,14 9 the Court held that it was unconstitutional for public

school teachers to provide secular education to private school chil-

dren in the classrooms of the private schools because the monitoring
of those teachers to insure that classes would be free of religious
influence fostered excessive entanglement between church and
state. 50 However, the Court did not overrule Wolman v. Walter 51 in

which similar services were held constitutional because they were offered off the premises of the private schools.15 1 It is difficult, if not
impossible, to discern why religious liberty
is compromised by one
1 53
educational program but not the other.
identified by reference to the specific act causing the violation, not by reference to a
practice (government entanglement with religion) which will often not result in an infringement of religious freedom. See Choper, supra note 18, at 681 ("avoidance of administrative entanglement between government and religion neither should, nor can, represent a value to be judicially secured by the Establishment Clause"); Mckeever, supra
note 6, at 1099-1102 (excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test should be abolished because it serves no interest protected by the establishment clause).
148. See Comment, Using the Lemon Test as Camouflage: Avoiding the Establishment Clause, 16 W14. MITCHELL L. REV. 835, 859 (1990) ("[tlhe principal problem
with the Lemon test . . . is that it allows courts to avoid asking the fundamental questions or applying the underlying principles of the establishment clause in a direct and
tangible way. The Lemon test deals with manifestations of the establishment clauses'
principles and not with the principles themselves"). This is not to say that the concerns
inherent in the Lemon test are not valid concerns, but rather that they are just concerns,
and should not constitute independent criteria without reference to the preservation of
religious liberty. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (the Lemon test provides "no
more than a helpful sign post in dealing with Establishment Clause challenges") (quoting, Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
149. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). See also supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 414.
151. 433 U.S. 229 (1977). See also supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
152. Id. at 244-48.
153. The majority in Felton attempted to justify the result by stating that "[w] hen
the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of religious significance, the freedom of religious beliefs of those who are not adherents of that denomination suffers, even when the governmental purpose underlying the involvement is largely
secular. In addition, the freedom of even the adherents of the denomination is limited by
the governmental intrusion into sacred matters." 473 U.S. at 409-10. As to the first
concern, the Court never adequately explained how providing secular instruction "enmeshed" the state in "matters of religious significance." As to the second concern, the
Court expressed the belief that representatives of the private school must "endure the
ongoing presence of state personnel whose primary purpose is to monitor teachers and
students in an attempt to guard against the infiltration of religious thought." Id. at 413.
The private schools were not forced to "endure" anything, however, and, if they felt that

Similarly, the Court in Wolman did not explain why religious liberty is infringed when a state provides money for secular field trips
for private school children, 5 but not when the state pays for the bus
transportation of private school children to and from school. 155 The
Wolman Court attempted to distinguish Everson on three grounds.
First, the Court stated that because the private schools controlled the
timing and frequency of the field trips, the schools rather than the
children were the true beneficiaries of the aid.1 6 However, it is difficult to understand how this distinction impacts religious freedom. In
Wolman, the government assisted the budgets of the private schools
by paying for their secular field trips, and in Everson the government
assisted their budgets by relieving them of the financial burden of
insuring that their children were able to be transported safely to and
from school. The effect on religious liberty was the same in either
case.
Second, the Wolman Court distinguished Everson on the grounds
that field trips, unlike bus transportation, are an "integral part of the
educational experience," and an "unacceptable risk of fostering religion is an inevitable byproduct," of government funding of those
trips.1 57 Although Everson may be distinguished in this manner,158
Board of Education v. Allen,159 in which the Court upheld the providing of secular textbooks, cannot be. It is indisputable that textbooks are as "integral" a part of the "educational experience" as
field trips. Furthermore, just like field trips, "it is the individual
teacher who makes a [discussion of a textbook] meaningful."160 Accordingly, there is no significant distinction between the state paying
for secular field trips for private school children and the state paying
for secular textbooks for those children.
Third, the Wolman Court distinguished Everson on the grounds
that the state's supervision of the private school teachers who led the
field trips resulted in excessive entanglement between church and
state. 6M However, the Court did not even attempt to explain how
such supervision infringes religious liberty. 162 In fact, the zealous suthe monitoring system employed by the public school authorities infringed their religious
liberty, the schools simply could have declined to participate in the program.
154. 433 U.S. at 252-54. See also supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
155. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See supra note 26.
156. 433 U.S. at 253.
157. Id.
158. Presumably, the religious freedom of nonadherents could be infringed if government funds were used to espouse a particular religious belief during the field trips. Of
course, the field trips were "designed to enrich the secular studies of students." 433 U.S.
at 252 (emphasis added).
159. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See supra note 26.
160. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 253.
161. Id.at 254.
162. Id.
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pervision of private school teachers to insure that they do not inculcate religious values during field trips arguably increases, not decreases, the religious freedom of nonadherents. 163
These examples demonstrate how the various prongs of the Lemon
test have obscured the goal of religious freedom which is the central
concern of the establishment clause.164 The next section of this Article examines whether Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis fares
any better in its attempt to guard religious freedom.
C.

The Failings of the Endorsement Test
Unlike the Lemon test, Justice O'Connor's endorsement test specifically identifies and defines the elements of religious liberty that it
is designed to protect. According to Justice O'Connor, the core concern of the establishment clause and religious freedom is that government must not make "adherence to religion relevant to a person's
standing in the political community." 16 5 Pursuant to this command,
government must not endorse or disapprove of religion because doing
so "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community and an accompanying message
to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community."1 66 Endorsement or disapproval of religion impairs religious freedom because "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial
support of the government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."'6 7
It is equally "plain" that Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis
defines "religious freedom" more directly than the Lemon test. The
endorsement test "properly suggests that establishment clause inquiry should focus on the impact of state actions on nonadherents of
benefitted creeds, lest the state place a 'badge of inferiority' on these
citizens because of their beliefs."' 6 8 Most statutes challenged under
163. The religious freedom of the schools is not a proper consideration as the
schools could simply decline the money if the conditions on its receipt were too onerous.
See also supra note 153 and infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
164. See Note, Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1607, 1644 (1987). ("[tlhe rigid formulation of the [Lemon] test is out of touch
with the establishment clause goal of preserving religious liberty").
165. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
166. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 688, 688 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (quoting, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431
(1962)).
168. Note, supra note 164, at 1647, quoting, Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of

the establishment clause will inevitably benefit one or more religious

sects and Justice O'Connor is quite right to analyze the constitutionality of such statutes by reference to how they impact those who are
not benefitted by the statute. One of the grave errors of the Court's
current establishment clause jurisprudence is the invalidation of certain forms of aid to parochial schools because the monitoring of that
aid allegedly impairs the religious freedom of the recipients of the

aid.'69 This analysis ignores the crucial fact that these recipients, if
they believe that such monitoring is too intrusive, can simply decline
to receive the aid and therefore avoid the impairment of their religious freedom.

The mere fact that the endorsement test defines religious liberty
more directly than the Lemon test, however, does not answer the
question whether the endorsement test should be applied by the
Court in future parochial school aid cases. Although the endorsement test initially received significant approval from commentators, 70 it has also been the subject of much criticism.17 ' Led by Professor Steven D. Smith," 2 these objectors believe that the test is
unworkable because it is "just a variant on the neutrality ideal,"' 73
which does not supply any meaningful standards which can be used4
to evaluate governmental practices which impact religious beliefs.,
These commentators argue that the endorsement test "leaves unanswered the critical question of what the proper criteria are" to determine establishment cause violations. 175
These criticisms do not take issue with Justice O'Connor's belief
that the core concern of the establishment clause is that government

Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1049, 1056 (1986).
169. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985), discussed supra note 153.
170. See Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 274 (1987) (citing
various articles and stating that "[n]umerous academic commentators have written approvingly of the [endorsement] test").
171. Id. at 331. ("the 'no endorsement' test is riddled with analytical flaws that
can only compound the confusion and inconsistency afflicting current establishment doctrine"); Esbeck, supra note 18, at 546 ("Justice O'Connor's enthusiasm for her 'no-endorsement' approach will hopefully abate and it can be forgotten"); See Hirt, "Symbolic
Union" of Church and State and the "Endorsement" of Sectarian Activity: A Critique
of Unwieldy Tools of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,24 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
823, 847 (1989); Ward, supra note 142, at 1748- 51; Evans, supra note 18, at 95.
172. See Smith, supra note 170.
173. Esbeck, supra note 18, at 545 (emphasis in original).
174. Smith, supra note 170, at 330 ("[t]he problem with the 'no favoritism' version of neutrality is that it is too gross; in its apparent absoluteness it gives no guidance
as what kinds of favoring are permissible and what kinds are not"). See also Paulsen,
supra note 18, at 333 (" '[n]eutrality', like 'equality', is a principle of relationship, not
content").
175. See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 18, at 330. See also Hirt, supra note 171, at
847 (the endorsement analysis in Lynch v. Donnelly supplies "no systemic rules" to be
applied in future cases).

[VOL. 28. 263. 1991]

ParochialSchool Aid
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

must not make a person's religious beliefs relevant to his standing in
the political community.' 7 6 In fact, Professor Smith explicitly stated

that this premise is "appealing" and "in some sense, correct.' ' 77 Instead, Professor Smith suggests that there is little connection be-

tween Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis and the goal of divorcing religion from a person's political standing. 78 He convincingly points out that a law may endorse religion without impacting a person's standing in the political community and viceversa. 17 9 Professor Smith concluded:
[i]f the goal of the establishment clause is to make political standing independent of religion ... [t]he Supreme Court should develop doctrine which
invalidates laws or practices that affect political or civil rights on religious
grounds. There is no apparent reason for the Court instead to adopt a doctrinal test focusing upon an altogether different factor [endorsement] which
is at best a less than faithful proxy for the goal the Court seeks to
achieve. 180

These criticisms, that the notion of endorsement is not self-defining, that there are circumstances where government endorsement of

religion does not necessarily lead to political harm because of one's

religious beliefs, and that there can be infringement of religious lib-

erty in circumstances apart from government endorsement of religion, carry much force. However, these criticisms do not contradict
the idea that the core value of the establishment clause is religious
liberty and that political standing and religious belief must not be
intertwined.' 8 ' Nor do these criticisms take issue with the suggestion
that some forms of government endorsement of religion, even absent
direct governmental coercion, will have the effect of altering a person's standing in the community because of his or her religious beliefs. 8 2 These criticisms simply suggest the need to (1) better define
176. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
177. Smith, supra note 170, at 305-06.
178.

Id. at 308-09.

179. Id. at 306-307. Professor Smith provides as an example a Tennessee law invalidated by the Supreme Court which excluded clergy from serving in the legislature.
See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). This law affected the political standing of
clergy because of their religion but it is unclear whether the law "communicated ap-

proval or disapproval of religion." Smith, supra note 170, at 306. The law could have
been based on the notion that ministers are unfit for public office, that ministers are too
important to be "sullied" by politics, or simply that government and religion should be
separated. Id. at 306-07. The important point is that the inquiry into whether or not the
law endorsed religion is a separate and distinct inquiry from whether the law impacted a
person's political standing because of his or her religion. Id.
180. Smith, supra note 170, at 309.
181. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
182. A governmentally sponsored "National Baptist School" would impact the po287

those circumstances where the government does endorse religion; (2)

define when that endorsement amounts to the infringement of religious liberty; and (3) identify other forms of governmental behavior
that infringe religious liberty apart from government endorsement of
religion.' 83
Although these questions highlight the need for a further refinement of Justice O'Connor's analysis, they do not suggest that the
analysis

should

be

abandoned

altogether.

Certainly,

Justice

O'Connor's endorsement test identifies the appropriate concerns of
the establishment clause more directly than the Lemon test.18 ' Accordingly, the remainder of this Article expands on those concerns
and applies that analysis to governmental programs assisting parochial schools.
IV. A RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ANALYSIS
If the appropriate concerns of the establishment clause are the
preservation of religious liberty and the separation of political standing and religious belief, establishment clause analysis should focus
on identifying those governmental practices which implicate those
concerns, not with concepts such as "advancement" and "endorsement."'8 5 The four general ways that a governmental practice can
litical standing of non-Baptists, not because they would be forced to attend that school or
change their religious views, but because "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of the government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion
is plain." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (quoting, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989), discussed supra notes 13436 and accompanying text, Justice Kennedy criticized the endorsement test as being "unworkable," and suggested that "coercion" should be the benchmark of establishment
clause analysis. 109 S. Ct. at 3141-46 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). As Justice Blackmun pointed out, however, an establishment clause standard that
prohibits only "coercive practices or overt efforts at government proselytization . . . but
fails to take account of the numerous more subtle ways the government can show favoritism to particular beliefs" would not adequately protect religious freedom. Id. at 3119.
Justice Kennedy, in fact, implicitly recognized Justice Blackmun's point when he conceded that the establishment clause would forbid "the permanent erection of a large
Latin cross on the roof of city hall ...because such an obtrusive year-round display
would place the government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of
a particular religion." Id. at 3137 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Distinguishing between non-coercive governmental conduct which amounts to "an
obvious effort to proselytize," and conduct which does not, requires an inquiry into the
factors discussed in the next section of this Article. See infra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
183. Justice O'Connor originally identified at least one other governmental practice that could infringe religious liberty apart from endorsement--excessive government
entanglement with religious institutions. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In later cases, however, Justice O'Connor has folded this inquiry into her endorsement analysis. See Hurt, supra note 12, at 19. For a discussion of how government
can infringe religious freedom without necessarily endorsing religion, see supra note 179.
184. See supra notes 145-83 and accompanying text.
185. See e.g., Feder, And a Child Shall Lead Them: Justice O'Connor, The Prin-
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infringe religious freedom are discussed below and then applied to
parochial school aid statutes.
A.

Penalizing,Prohibiting,or Mandating Religious Beliefs or
Practices

The most direct form of governmental conduct which infringes religious freedom are laws which directly penalize, prohibit or mandate religious beliefs or practices. The Supreme Court has generally
analyzed such cases under the free exercise clause, not the establish-

ment clause. 186 Historically, the Court has applied a balancing test
to such cases and asks whether there is a compelling state interest

justifying the burden on religious freedom. 187 However, regardless of
whether such cases are analyzed under the free exercise clause, the

establishment clause, or both, 8 8 religiously neutral parochial school
aid statutes which provide financial or other educational assistance
to private schools do not penalize, prohibit or mandate religious beliefs or practices.
B.

Requiring Individuals to Forego Governmental Benefits

Unless They Alter Their Religious Beliefs or Practices or
DistributingBenefits Unequally Because of Religious Beliefs or
Practices

The government infringes religious freedom when it unequally
doles out benefits based on religious belief or when it requires individuals to modify their religious beliefs or practices in order to receive a governmental benefit. 189 Such cases are also generally reciple of Religious Liberty and its PracticalApplication, 8

(1988).

PACE

L. REV. 249, 249-51

186. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (state could not prohibit
clergy from serving in state legislature); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state
could not require Amish children to attend school until they reach the age of sixteen in
violation of Amish religious tenants); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state
could not force a Seventh-Day Adventist to accept jobs requiring working on Saturday in
order to collect unemployment compensation).
187. See Beschle, supra note 76, at 159-63 (discussing the Court's free exercise
cases and the compelling state interest standard applied by the Court). But see Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (the court did not apply the compelling
state interest test while rejecting a free exercise challenge to a religiously neutral law
prohibiting the use of narcotics.). In light of Smith, it is unclear what kind of analysis
the Court will apply to future free exercise cases.
188. See supra note 144.
189. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (state university could not
deny religious groups access to campus facilities generally available to other groups);
Thomas v. Review Board of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (state

solved under the free exercise clause.19 0 Governmental programs
providing assistance to public and private schools on a religiously
neutral basis do not fall into this category because they do not require individuals to alter their religious beliefs in order to obtain a
governmental benefit, nor do they distribute benefits unequally because of religious beliefs or practices.
C. Placing Governmental Power, Prestige and/or Financial
Support Behind a ParticularReligion or FavoringReligion Over
Non-Religion
Governmental behavior which favors or endorses one religion over
another or religion over non-religion infringes religious freedom because "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of the government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."'"" Although this type of infringement of religious liberty is similar to Justice O'Connor's articulation of the endorsement test, it is not identical to the
implementation of that test by Justice O'Connor. Contrary to her
analysis, the appropriate question is not simply whether government
is "endorsing" religion, which it arguably does whenever it supplies a
benefit to religious groups, regardless of whether the benefit is also
provided to non-religious groups, but whether the government endorsement actually infringes religious liberty. 192
D.

Using Tax Proceeds to Favor or Penalize Religious Beliefs or
Practices

The Supreme Court has stated that "[n]o tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion.' 193 Even the most ardent
separationists would have to concede, however, that this is a gross
overstatement - otherwise police and fire protection could not be
provided to churches or church schools.' Nevertheless, the use of
could not deny unemployment benefits to a worker who quit his job rather than accept a
transfer to a division which would require work contrary to his religion).
190. See Beschle, supra note 76, at 163.
191. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting, Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
192. See infra notes 203-19 and accompanying text, for an application of this standard to religiously neutral parochial school aid statutes.
193. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
194. See supra note 164, at 1676 n.1 1 ("[n]o commentator argues . . . that religiously affiliated schools could be denied governmentally provided fire protection or sewage service.").

290 ,
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tax funds to assist religious schools arguably infringes the religious
liberty of those taxpayers who did not wish to support that religion.
This contention is discussed in the next section of this Article. 19 5
A governmental practice that has none of the above effects, does

not infringe religious freedom and therefore does not violate the establishment clause.' The next section of this
Article applies these
97
prohibitions to parochial school aid statutes.
195. See infra notes 220-27 and accompanying text. Another commentator, who
believes that governmental coercion should be the central concern of the establishment
clause, has compiled a similar list of the various ways that government can infringe religious freedom by coercing religious belief. See Ward, supra note 142, at 1746-53.
On occasion, the Court has suggested that "political divisiveness" can lead to the invalidation of a governmental practice under the establishment clause. See, e.g., Lemon,
403 U.S. at 622-25, discussed supra note 34. At least one commentator, embracing a
religious liberty analysis, has embraced that suggestion. See Feder, supra note 185, at
267-68. In recent cases, however, the Court has suggested that this doctrine should be
limited to those instances involving "direct financial subsidies to parochial schools."
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.11 (1983). The Court has never, however, adequately explained how "political divisiveness" infringes religious liberty. See generally
Choper, supra note 18, at 683-85. Professor Choper was correct when he concluded that
"if a law serves genuinely secular purposes-or impairs no one's religious liberty by coercing, compromising or influencing religious beliefs-there is no persuasive reason to hold it
unconstitutional simply because its proponents and opponents were divided along religious lines." Choper at 684.
196. Justice O'Connor would begin her analysis by asking whether the "actual
purpose" of the challenged legislation, apart from its actual effect, is to "endorse or disapprove of religion," and she would invalidate any statute that fails this test. Lynch, 465
U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This analysis, in addition to having all of the
flaws inherent in any judicial inquiry into the subjective motivations of legislators (see
Smith, supra note 170, at 283-86), also poses the wrong question. If any inquiry into
legislative attempt is to be made, the better question would be whether the legislature
acted for the purpose of infringing religious freedom by linking political standing with
religious belief. After all, a legislature can endorse religion without necessarily violating
the establishment clause. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. Even this question, however, is unnecessary. A statute either infringes religious freedom or it does not.
That question must be resolved, not by resort to the motives underlying the legislation,
but how the statute has operated in practice. Simply put, "[m]otive based inquiry. . . is
an unprofitable constitutional exercise." Lively, supra note 18, at 686. See also Choper,
supra note 18, at 687 (religious purpose alone, without more, should not invalidate legislation unless the law also infringes religious liberty).
197. Although the starting point of all establishment clause inquiries should be the
same, i.e., does the governmental practice at issue fall into one of four categories enumerated above, the standards governing that determination will vary depending on the
type of establishment clause case that is before the Court. The determination of what
kind of religious symbols may be placed on government property, for example, or under
what circumstances government may prohibit religious practices because they conflict
with secular objectives, will be based on different set of specific criteria than those governing what kind of aid government may provide to religious schools. See Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 89 ("Our responsibility is not to apply tidy formulas by rote; our
duty is to determine whether the statute or practice at issue is a step toward establishing
a state religion.") (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This Article is limited to determining what

VI.
A.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND PAROCHIAL SCHOOL AID

Educational Benefits Must be Provided on a Religiously

Neutral Basis and Must Not Have a Substantive Content That

Favors One Religion Over Another or Religion Over Non-Religion
First, if the government aids only parochial schools of certain
faiths, or aids parochial schools more than public schools, that practice would violate the establishment clause because the government

would be providing benefits, educational assistance, unevenly based
on religious belief. In addition this practice would send a message
that the government approves the religious affiliation of the schools
that it is assisting and not the religious affiliation of the schools it is
not assisting. Such practices would infringe religious freedom by
making a person's political standing in the community (eligibility for
educational benefits) dependent on religious beliefs. Accordingly, to
avoid infringing religious freedom, the government must assist all
private schools, regardless of religious affiliation, equally, and must
not assist religious schools more than public schools.'
Moreover, whatever form the assistance takes, it cannot convey
the substantive message that the government prefers one religion

over another or religion over nonreligion.199 Although such assistance
would not necessarily coerce anyone to believe a certain way, it
would place the power, prestige and financial support of the government behind religious belief such that there would be pressure upon
nonadherents to conform to the officially approved religion. 200
kind of aid government can constitutionally provide to parochial schools and does not
attempt to answer other establishment clause questions. However, the general categories
of impermissible government behavior discussed above should be applied to all establishment clause questions.
Also beyond the scope of this Article is whether the aid to parochial schools (discussed
in the next section), rather than being forbidden under the establishment clause, is ever
required to be provided under the free exercise clause. See Paulsen, supra note 18, at
358.
198. Applying different analyses, other commentators have reached similar conclusions. See Paulsen, supra note 18, at 358 ("judicial inquiry should be directed toward
making sure that the overall effect of government policy does not impermissibly tilt the
financial scales involved in making the decision of whether or not to attend a religious
school.") (applying equal protection analysis to establishment clause cases); Beschle,
supra note 76, at 184 ("clearly, aid to only one or any number of chosen [religious
schools] would be impermissible.") (applying a pure endorsement, or "liberal neutrality"
analysis); Marshall, supra note 10, at 548 (aid to parochial schools "must be no greater
than that provided all students, including those attending public schools") (applying a
"symbolic" test to establishment clause cases).
199. For instance, by providing monetary assistance that has to be used by all
beneficiaries for the purpose of understanding the Catholic faith.
200. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting, Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
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B. Providing Secular Educational Materials And Instruction to
ParochialSchool Children
When a state provides secular educational benefits, such as materials and equipment,20 1 or publicly funded secular instruction,0 2 to
children attending religious schools that is comparable to those benefits being provided to children in nonreligious schools, the state does
not penalize religion, does not provide a government benefit unequally based on religious belief, and does not force any citizen to
give up a religious belief in order to obtain a governmental benefit.
More difficult questions are whether such aid impermissibly endorses
the religious message of the private schools or impermissibly uses tax
dollars to support religion.
1. To answer the first question, as long as the aid is earmarked for
secular purposes, and is provided in a similar fashion to all private
and public schools, the state is not favoring one religion over another
or religion over nonreligion. However, this kind of aid was invalidated in Wolman v. Walter,2 03 and Meek v. Pittenger. °4 In both
cases, the Court reasoned that, by assisting the secular mission of
the private schools, the state was also assisting the religious mission
of the schools because those missions could not be separated. 0 5 In
neither case did the Court identify how religious liberty was infringed by such an indirect advancement of religious beliefs.20 6 By
limiting the educational equipmefit and materials to secular purposes
and by providing it evenhandedly among all religious and non-religious schools, the states were not communicating 2any
message of ap07
proval or disapproval of anyone's religious belief.
For the same reasons, the state does not communicate a message
of approval or disapproval of religion when it pays for public school
201. See Board of Education v. Allen (state providing secular textbooks to private
school children), discussed supra note 26; Meek v. Pittenger and Wolman v. Walter
(state providing secular educational equipment and materials to private school children),
supra notes 48-54 and 60-75 and accompanying text.
202. See School District of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball and Aguilar v. Felton,
discussed supra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
203. 433 U.S. 229 (1977), discussed supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
204. 421 U.S. 349 (1975), discussed supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 53, 71 and accompanying text.
206. The Court simply assumed that the advancement of religion itself was a constitutional evil prohibited under the establishment clause. See 421 U.S. at 366; 433 U.S.
at 250-51. See also supra note 146.
207. Such aid really "endorses" the proposition that the state wants all school children to have the best possible secular'education (regardless of where they go to school
and regardless of their religious beliefs), a purpose consistent with the establishment
clause. See Paulsen, supra note 18, at 358.

teachers to provide secular education to children attending parochial
schools, regardless of whether the instruction is provided inside or
outside the classrooms of the parochial schools, as long as such instruction is provided on an equal basis to all schools. However, the
Supreme Court has held in Grand Rapids and Felton that publicly
funded instruction inside parochial school classrooms is unconstitutional.20 8 I have already demonstrated that the Court in Felton did
not identify how the use of such teachers, or the monitoring of those
teachers to guard against the transmission of religious beliefs, infringed religious liberty. 200 As far as the programs in Grand Rapids
are concerned, none of the reasons provided by the Court for the
invalidation of those programs were sufficient to justify the conclusion that the government was infringing religious liberty in that case.
The Court in GrandRapids offered three reasons why the funding
of teachers to provide secular education in the private schools violated the establishment clause. 210 First, the Court held that, although the programs were limited to secular education, even the best
intentioned teachers may become inadvertently involved in transmitting religious beliefs when they teach in the pervasively sectarian atmosphere of the private schools. 211 Assuming that the actual transmission of religious beliefs by publicly funded teachers would violate
the establishment clause, 212 the Court in GrandRapids did not identify a single instance where such an illegal transmission of a religious
message occurred. Moreover, because the statute explicitly prohibited the transmission of any such message, it would be illogical, absent evidence to the contrary, to conclude that the programs in
Grand Rapids endorsed or approved any such message.
Justice O'Connor agreed that it was unconstitutional to pay the
salaries of private school teachers to provide secular education at
night to private school students because "[w]hen full-time parochial
school teachers receive public funds to teach secular courses to their
parochial school students under parochial school supervision, .. .
the program has the perceived and actual effect of advancing the
religious aims of the church-related schools." 21 3 However, Justice
O'Connor did not address why, even if such a program was perceived
to, and actually did, "advance the religious aims" of the private
schools, such an advancement infringed religious liberty. Because the
aid was provided to all schools regardless of religious affiliation, and
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
part).

294

See
See
See
473
See
473

supra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text.
supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
U.S. at 387.
supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
U.S. at 399-400 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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because the statute explicitly prohibited the teaching of religion, the
government was simply endorsing the proposition that religious
schools would not be disqualified from receiving the aid because of
their religious affiliation. Such an "advancement" does not favor one
religion over another or cause nonadherents to believe that the government is approving or disapproving their religion. Accordingly, this
kind of "advancement" does not infringe religious liberty.
The Court in Grand Rapids also held that the programs caused
"the symbolic union of government and religion in one sectarian enterprise," and therefore were unconstitutional. 14 The Court was concerned that both students and the public at large would perceive the
government as endorsing the religious beliefs of the schools by aiding
the secular education of the schools.215 However, the programs in
Grand Rapids were offered to schools of all faiths and did not provide private school children with superior benefits to those provided
children in public schools. Accordingly, a fully informed individual
would know that the state was not preferring one religion over another or religion over non-religion. 2"1 The erroneous perception by
some students or members of the public that the state was endorsing
the religious message of their particular schools does not justify the
invalidation of a program which does not endorse any such message.
The third justification offered by the Court in Grand Rapids was
that the programs provided an unlawful subsidy to the private
schools because, by assisting the secular educational mission of the
private schools, the Court was also advancing the religion mission of
the schools.2 17 As with the equipment and materials invalidated in
Meek and Wolman2"1 the Court did not explain how religious liberty
is infringed by such an indirect advancement of religious belief.
Moreover, the identical instructional programs that were invalidated
in Grand Rapids would have been constitutional under Wolman v.
Walter,21 9 had they been offered off the premises of the private
schools, even though they would have subsidized the religious mission of the schools in exactly the same way. Accordingly, none of the
reasons set forth by the Court in Grand Rapids justified the Court's
214.

473 U.S. at 392.

215. Id. at 397.

216. In fact, the Court itself implicitly reached this same conclusion because it
found that the programs were not enacted for a religious purpose in violation of the first
prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 383.
217. Id. at 392-97.
218. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.

finding that the programs violated the establishment clause.
2. The other kind of religious freedom that could arguably be implicated by the providing of secular educational benefits on a religiously neutral basis to children in parochial schools is the freedom
not to have one's tax dollars spent to support religion.220 Presumably,
if the Supreme Court is correct in concluding that it is impossible to
assist only the secular education or mission of parochial schools without also assisting the religious mission,221 then it could be argued
that tax dollars of nonadherents should222not be spent to assist the
religious mission of the private schools.
If tax proceeds are distributed to all schools, religious and nonreligious equally, then no religious distinction is being made by the state
and a person's standing in the political community is not impacted
by his religious beliefs. 223 There is a constitutionally significant difference between infringing religious liberty by directly taxing a
group because of its religious belief, or distributing the proceeds of
tax collection to religious groups unequally, or using tax proceeds for
religious purposes and using tax revenues to achieve secular goals on
a religiously neutral basis.224 Such a use does not infringe religious
liberty because it does not link political standing to religious belief.
Aditionally, it is quite often the case that government spends tax
dollars to advocate messages that many members of the community
might find objectionable, such as warnings about tobacco products or
encouragement of various birth control options. However, such objections do not amount to first amendment violations. 22 5 It makes no
sense "to treat the disbursement of

. .

. funds to religious institu-

tions or individuals as any more coercive to taxpayers than other expenditures of tax monies that taxpayers, for religious or nonreligious
reasons, may find objectionable. ' 226 Therefore, the use of tax proceeds to assist educational institutions on a religiously neutral basis
220. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
222. Professor Choper has taken this position. See Choper, supra note 18, at 675,
679-80.
223. In fact, if the government were to withhold widely dispersed benefits to citizens solely because of their religious beliefs, such a practice might very well violate the
free exercise clause. See Paulsen, supra note 18, at 358 and supra note 197.
224. See Ward, supra note 142, at 1753. For instance, using tax revenues to provide fire and police protection to churches raises no constitutional question. See supra
note 194.
225. Although the Supreme Court has held that taxpayers have standing to raise
establishment clause challenges solely because they are taxpayers, Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968), the Court has never held that the mere fact that their taxes have been
used in violation of a person's religious tenants results in an establishment clause violation. Instead, the Court has correctly insisted on a showing that the governmental conducted funded by the tax violated the Lemon test, the endorsement test, or some other
establishment clause principle.
226. Ward, supra note 142, at 1753.
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does not infringe religious liberty.

Accordingly, the providing of secular educational equipment such
as maps, globes, and computers, on a religiously neutral basis, as

well as the funding of teachers to provide secular education to parochial school children, does not infringe religious liberty.22 7 Therefore,

such programs do not violate the establishment clause.
C. Tuition Credits, Tax Benefits and Non-EducationalAid
If the government does not infringe religious liberty by providing
educational assistance to parochial schools on a religiously neutral

basis, it also does not do so by providing non-educational aid such as

bus transportation, 2 8 or grants for building repair, 229 as long as the

aid is provided to all private schools equally, is less than or equal to
the aid provided to public schools, and is limited to secular purposes. 230 A somewhat more difficult question is whether it is constitutional for a state to provide parents of private school children with

tax credits or tuition reimbursements to defray the cost of sending
their children to private schools.2 31 The most extreme example of

such an aid program would involve the government reimbursing parents of children attending private schools for the cost of the secular

education of their children. Such a program would subsidize the secular education of all children in the state regardless of where they

attend school.2 32 If such aid is constitutional, the programs in Nyquist,2 33 Mueller, 34 and Lemon,2" 5 would also be constitutional.

227. Of course, in any given community a religiously neutral statute may be implemented in such a way as to favor one religion over another or religion over non-religion.
See Beschle, supra note 76, at 185. For instance; a systematic attempt by a state to
allocate its best teachers to schools of a certain religious belief would make those schools
more desirable to attend and therefore constitute an unconstitutional preferential endorsement of those schools. Id. In such a situation, however, it is the implementation of
the statute that would be enjoined, not the statute itself.
228. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), discussed supra note 26.
229. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973), discussed supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
230. The Court in Nyquist invalidated a program that provided grants to private
schools for the repair of buildings where the grants were not limited to secular use and
could have been used to repair a chapel or pay the salaries of workers maintaining the

chapel. 413 U.S. at 774.

231. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), discussed supra notes 89-93 and
accompanying text; Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1983), discussed supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
232. Of course, any such aid must be provided equally to children attending all
private schools, regardless of religious affiliation, and must be less than or equal to the
amount of aid provided the public schools. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.

The governmental subsidization of the secular education of children in both public and private schools does not penalize religion,
does not provide an unequal governmental benefit based on religious
belief, and does not force any citizen to give up a religious belief in
order to obtain a governmental benefit. Moreover, for the reasons
discussed in the preceding section,'" simply using tax dollars to provide educational benefits on a religiously neutral basis does not infringe the religious liberty of taxpayers. Accordingly, such aid would
violate religious liberty only if it endorsed religious beliefs to the extent that it caused nonadherents to believe that the government disapproved of their religion.
A statute that allowed the government to finance secular education for all children in the state would send a message that the government was not going to distinguish between religion and non-religion in the area of secular education. Although such aid would
certainly make it easier for religious schools to exist, perhaps advance their religious goals, and even cause entanglement between
public and religious officials, as long as all parents in the state could
send their children to public schools and receive a state paid-for education equal to or greater than the amount of subsidized education in
the private schools, such aid would not favor one religion over another or religion over non-religion. Accordingly, such aid would not
infringe religious liberty, and therefore would not offend the establishment clause.
CONCLUSION

Starting from the premise that the core concern of the establishment clause is religious liberty, this Article has demonstrated that
the traditional three part Lemon test and Justice O'Connor's endorsement test do not provide adequate standards to evaluate
whether governmental practices violate the establishment clause.
However, the endorsement test is at least grounded in the correct
principle that religious freedom is impaired when the government
connects political standing and religious belief. Such a connection
can occur only when the government penalizes, prohibits or mandates religious beliefs or practices; distributes benefits unequally because of religious beliefs or practices; or engages in other acts which
favor or endorse one religion over another or religion over nonreligion.
Applying these principles to the Court's parochial school aid cases
is not difficult. In none of the cases did the government (state or
234.
235.
236.

See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
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federal) provide a benefit to a religious school that was not already
provided to non-religious schools, and in none of the cases did the
government favor any particular religious belief, or religion as compared to non-religion. Additionally, the statutes did not penalize or
reward religious belief, or encourage anyone to adopt or not adopt
religious belief. The most that can be said about all of these statutes
is that they did not eliminate private religious schools from the category of schools eligible to receive governmental educational assistance. The failure to exclude these schools based on their religious
affiliation does not infringe the religious liberty of any citizen and
therefore does not violate the establishment clause.

